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System reliability assessments provide important input to decision-making in relation to design-
related issues as well as during operation and maintenance. The main purpose of a system reliability
assessment is to provide realistic predictions of the future performance of the system, within the
constraints of available data, operating conditions, and modeling capabilities. Special applications
and operating conditions sometimes reveal inadequacies in current assessment methods. One such
application is the blowout preventer (BOP), a safety-critical system that is used to ensure safe
drilling and well interventions of oil and gas wells. The ability of the BOP system to function as a
safety barrier depends on the ongoing operation, whether it is drilling, tripping-in, tripping-out, well
logging, and so on. At the same time, the likelihood of demands to be handled depends on the same
operations. An average estimate of the BOP’s ability to function on demand is therefore not an
adequate reliability parameter. A BOP system deviates from many other safety barrier systems since
it does not have a fail-safe design (except for the choke and kill valves). Another deviation is due to
the many different uses of the BOP and its components. Many of the components are operated much
more often than during the periodic proof tests. The usual formulas for reliability calculations based
on periodic proof testing can therefore not be used directly.
In this master thesis, the main objective is to propose solutions to some of the challenges indicated
above, using the BOP as an example. More specifically, the candidate shall:
1. Give a presentation of a typical (standard) BOP system, its requirements and reliability
challenges
a. Describe and classify the main functions and the associated performance requirements
of a BOP system.
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b. Identify and discuss the main operating situations of a BOP in light of the ability of the
BOP to stop well kicks.
c. Identify recent BOP stack configurations and describe the pros and cons of these
related to a standard BOP configuration.
2. Suggest improved approaches to reliability assessment of BOF systems that can incorporate
some of the above challenges
a. Carry out and document a literature survey on how reliability analyses of BOPs have
been performed in the past, and discuss the limitations of these approaches.
b. Suggest alternative methods for BOP reliability assessment and illustrate their pros
and cons through a case study.
c. Propose a new overall approach to risk and reliability assessment of a BOP system,
which includes proposals for how to solve some of the identified challenges.
d. Identify related issues that need further research, and give recommendations for such
research.
Within three weeks after the date of the task handout, a pre-study report shall be prepared. The report
shall cover the following:
• An analysis of the work task’s content with specific emphasis of the areas where new
knowledge has to be gained.
• A description of the work packages that shall be performed. This description shall lead to a
clear definition of the scope and extent of the total task to be performed.
• A time schedule for the project. The plan shall comprise a Gantt diagram with specification
of the individual work packages, their scheduled start and end dates and a specification of
project milestones.
The pre-study report is a part of the total task reporting. It shall be included in the final report.
Progress reports made during the project period shall also be included in the final report.
The report should be edited as a research report with a summary, table of contents, conclusion, list of
reference, list of literature etc. The text should be clear and concise, and include the necessary
references to figures, tables, and diagrams. It is also important that exact references are given to any
external source used in the text.
Equipment and software developed during the project is a part of the fulfilment of the task. Unless
outside parties have exclusive property rights or the equipment is physically non-moveable, it should
be handed in along with the final report. Suitable documentation for the correct use of such material
is also required as part of the final report.
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Summary  
A blowout preventer is a safety critical system that is used during drilling and well 
interventions of oil and gas wells to make sure the operations are safe. The main function of 
a blowout preventer system is to seal the well in order to prevent a blowout. There are 
several different blowout prevent stack configurations in use, and each of these 
configurations have their pros and cons.  
Giving an accurate representation of the reliability of a blowout preventer system can be 
challenging. A blowout preventer goes through many different operational situations, and 
the BOP`s ability to act as a safety barrier will vary for each of these situations. Giving an 
average estimate of the BOP`s ability to function on demand is therefore not an adequate 
reliability parameter. The main objective of this master thesis is therefore to propose a new 
and improved method for reliability assessment of blowout preventer systems.  
A new approach to reliability assessment of blowout preventers is presented in this thesis. 
To account for the sequence of events, a fault tree analysis is combined with an event tree 
analysis. Fault tree analyses are performed to calculate the PFD for each of the branches in 
the event tree. The probability of each of the end states in the event tree can then be 
calculated. This will give a more accurate result then a fault tree analysis on its own. 
Separate analyses are made for the two main operational situations. One for the operational 
situations “open hole” and another for the operational situation “drill pipe going through the 
BOP”. Having two separate analyses gives a more accurate representation of the reliability at 
the given times, because the barriers in effect vary depending on what operational situation 
the BOP is going through. 
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Sammendrag 
En utblåsningssikring er et sikkerhetskritisk system som brukes under boring og 
brønnintervensjoner av olje og gass brønner for å sørge for sikker drift. Hovedfunksjonen til 
en utblåsning er å forsegle brønnen for å hindre en utblåsning. Det finnes flere forskjellige 
sammensettinger av utblåsningssikringer, og hver av disse sammensettingene har sine 
fordeler og ulemper.  
Å gi et presist estimat av påliteligheten til en utblåsningssikring kan by på utfordringer. En 
utblåsningssikring går gjennom mange forskjellige operative faser, og evnen til å fungere 
som en sikkerhetsbarriere vil variere for hver av disse fasene. Et gjennomsnittlig estimat av 
påliteligheten vil derfor ikke være presist nok. Hovedmålet med denne masteroppgaven er 
derfor å foreslå en ny og forbedret metode for pålitelighetsvurdering av utblåsningssikringer.  
En ny metode for pålitelighetvurdering av utblåsningssikringer er presentert i denne 
oppgaven. En feiltreanalyse er kombinert med en hendelsestreanalyse for å ta hensyn til 
hendelsesforløpet. Feiltreanalyser er utført for å beregne PFD for hver av grenene i 
hendelsestreet. Sannsynligheten for hver av slutt-tilstandene i hendelsestreet kan da 
bergenes. Dette vil gi et mer nøyaktig resultat enn en feiltreanalyse ville gitt på egenhånd. 
Separate analyser er gjort for de to viktigste operative fasene. En for den operative fasen 
"åpent hull" og en annen for den operative fasen "borerør gjennom BOP". Å ha to separate 
analyser gir en mer nøyaktig gjengivelse av påliteligheten, fordi hvilke barrierene som er 
tilgjengelig varierer avhengig av hvilken operativ fase utblåsningssikringen befinner seg i. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
System reliability assessment is used to gain important information used for decision-making 
in design related issues as well as during operation and maintenance. This helps predict how 
the system may perform in the future, within the constraints of available data and modeling 
capabilities. Having an accurate way of doing a reliability analysis is important, because it is a 
government requirement to know the reliability of the equipment.  
However, for some complex systems, the current assessment methods in use sometimes 
prove to be insufficient. A blowout preventer (BOP) is an example of this.  A BOP is a safety-
critical system that is used during drilling and well interventions of oil and gas wells to make 
sure the operations are safe. The main function of a BOP system is to seal the well in order 
to prevent a blowout. The BOP is a very important component, and failure of the BOP can 
lead to catastrophically events. An example of what can happen if the BOP does not function 
when needed, is the Deepwater horizon accident. In this tragic event, eleven men died and 
almost five million barrels of oil leaked from the Macondo well and in to the Gulf of Mexico.  
 The BOP goes through many different operational situations, and the BOP`s ability to act as 
a safety barrier will vary for each of these situations. In addition to that, the probability that 
a situation occurs that require the BOP to act as a safety barrier also depends on the various 
operational situations.  Because of this, the BOP`s average ability to function on demand 
may not be a sufficient reliability parameter.  Another challenge is that the reliability 
calculations based on test intervals operates with a fixed test interval. In practice, the test 
interval may vary, so the result will be too optimistic.  
These special conditions require a new and improved way of performing a reliability 
assessment. If a solution to some of the challenges mentioned above was found, it would 
make reliability assessment of BOP`s more accurate.  
1.2 Objectives 
The main objective of this master thesis is to propose an improved method of performing 
reliability analysis of a BOP system. More specifically:  
1. Give a presentation of a typical (standard) BOP system, its requirements and 
reliability challenges 
a. Describe and classify the main functions and the associated performance 
requirements of a BOP system. 
b. Identify and discuss the main operation situations of a BOP in light of the 
ability of the BOP to stop well kicks. 
c. Identify recent BOP stack configurations and describe the pros and cons of 
these related to a standard BOP configurations 
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2. Suggest improved approaches to reliability assessment of BOP systems that can 
incorporate some of the above challenges 
a. Carry out and document a literature survey on how reliability analyses of 
BOPs have been performed in the past, and discuss the limitations of these 
approaches. 
b. Suggest alternative methods for BOP reliability assessment and illustrate their 
pros and cons through a case study 
c. Propose a new overall approach to risk and reliability assessment of BOP 
systems, which include proposals for how to solve some of the identified 
challenges 
d. Identify related issues that need further research, and give recommendations 
for such research. 
1.3 Limitations 
The BOPs studied in this master thesis are limited to subsea BOPs used during drilling. The 
main focus will be on applications of BOPs on the Norwegian continental shelf.   
 The analyses that are done are not that thorough, so the results do not give an accurate 
representation of how the systems will actually perform during real operations. The analyses 
are rather meant as an example to show how they should be performed. The analysis are 
qualitative analysis.  
1.4 Research Approach 
To solve the problems, information was gathered mostly through searching on the web 
through databases like Science Direct, OnePetro and Google scholar. Standards and articles 
on the subject was the main source of information. Books on the subject and similar papers 
were also used. To find this information, search words like BOP, reliability, requirements, 
subsea, etc. were used. Frequent meetings and discussions with my supervisor on how to 
solve the problems have also been done regularly.  
1.5 Structure of the Report 
The rest of the report is structured as follows. 
Chapter two: A brief summary of the most relevant literature on the subject is 
presented.  
Chapter three:  Gives a quick introduction to different reliability methods, SIL and 
classification of functions. 
Chapter four: Describes the operational situations that the BOP will go through 
during various parts of operations. What barriers that will be in effect 
during the different operational situations will be discussed.  
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Chapter five: Gives a general overview of a BOP system and the main components. 
This is done so that the reader will understand what exactly a BOP is 
and how it function.  
Chapter six:  Discusses the pros and cons with how different BOP stack 
configurations are put together. Three different BOP stacks are 
identified and compared. The stacks identified are; The Deepwater 
Horizon BOP stack, the classical BOP stack and a typical modern stack 
BOP stack. 
Chapter seven: Presents the main functions and requirements of a BOP system. The 
functions identified will also be classified as shown by Rausand and 
Høyland (2004)  
Chapter eight:  Describes the challenges associated with performing a reliability 
assessment of a BOP system.  
Chapter nine:  Presents an example of how a fault tree analysis can be performed, 
and gives a better overview of what component failures will lead to 
the top event. An FMECA analysis is also presented.  
Chapter ten:  Discusses how reliability analyses have been performed in the past, 
and discusses the pros and cons of some of these methods.   
Chapter eleven:  Introduces an alternatives method for reliability assessments.  
Chapter twelve:  Suggests an overall new approach to risk and reliability assessment of 
a BOP system. 
Chapter Thirteen:  Conclusion and further work.  
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2 Literature Survey 
This chapter presents the most relevant literature and standards on the subject that were 
found and used during this master thesis. This literature survey is presented so that the 
readers can get a good overview of what has been done on this subject in the past, and so 
that they will know where to look if they want to know more about the subject.  
2.1 SINTEF`s BOP Reliability studies 
The most thorough reliability study of BOP systems has been carried out by SINTEF. From 
1981 to 2001, SINTEF carried out a number of reliability studies of subsea BOP systems on 
behalf of various oil companies and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD). The studies 
that have been carried out are:   
Phase I: Analysis of failure date from 61 exploration wells drilled from 
semisubmersible rigs and BOP system analysis (Rausand, 1983a). 
Phase II: Analysis of failure data from 99 exploration wells from semisubmersible rigs 
and mechanical evaluation of BOP components (Rausand et al., 1985) & (Hals 
and Molnes, 1984). 
Phase III: Evaluation of operation and maintenance of subsea BOP components, test 
procedures and operational control (Holand and Molnes, 1986). 
Phase IV: Analysis of 58 exploration wells, drilled during the period 1982-1986. Fault 
tree analysis was used to assess the availability of the BOP (Holand, 1987). 
Phase V: Analysis of 47 exploration wells, drilled during the period 1987-1989. The BOP 
failures were recorded and analyzed, and recommendations regarding test 
intervals were given (Holand, 1989). 
Phase I DW:  Analysis of 140 wells drilled from 1992 to 1997. Fault tree analysis was used to 
compare three types of control systems regarding their ability to close in a 
well when a kick occurred (Holand, 1997a) & (Holand, 1997b). 
Phase II DW:   Analysis of 83 wells drilled in water depths of 400-2000 meters during the 
period 1997-1998. The report is written for The Mineral Management Service 
(MMS), and evaluation of both the safety and downtime aspect of failures are 
presented (Holand, 1999). 
Other:  The report “Deepwater Kicks and BOP Performance” is a follow up study of 
Phase II DW. Fault tree analysis was used to analyze the BOP as a safety 
barrier based on BOP configurations and the relevant kick experience (Holand 
and Skalle, 2001). 
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2.2 BOEMRE  
Blowout Preventer Maintenance and Inspection in Deepwater Operations, (work in 
progress)  
BOEMRE is currently writing a report on the subject “Blowout Preventer Maintenance and 
Inspection in Deepwater Operations”. The study will compare current BOP maintenance, 
inspection and testing practices to standards, regulations and recommended practices. 
Quantitative analysis will be performed in order to determine the criticality and reliability of 
the BOP system (BOEMRE, 2011a). 
Report regarding the causes of the April 20, 2010 Macondo well blowout, 2011 
This report sets forth in detail the investigation findings, conclusions, and recommendations 
regarding the reason for the Deepwater Horizon accident. The findings and conclusions are 
presented in the following subject areas: Well design, cementing, possible flow paths, 
temporary abandonment in the Macondo well, kick detection and rig response, ignition 
source and explosion, the failure of the Deepwater Horizon blowout preventer, regulatory 
findings and conclusions and company practices (BOEMRE, 2011b). 
2.3 WEST Publications 
Blowout Prevention Equipment Reliability Joint Industry Project (phase I – Subsea), 2009 
A reliability study conducted to examine the historical reliability of subsea well control 
system operating in the GoM under the jurisdiction of the MMA. The goal of the study was 
to understand how testing impacts BOP reliability, and to determine a recommended 
optimal test frequency in order to improve efficiency while maintaining the reliability of the 
BOP (WEST, 2009). 
Evaluation of Shear Ram Capabilities, 2004 
This is a study of the BOP`s capability to shear a pipe ram at the most demanding conditions 
to be expected. Data from three BOP shear ram manufacturers and one drill pipe 
manufacturer were collected and a review and comparison of the manufacturer`s shear 
testing criteria, equipment failures and ram configurations were done (WEST, 2004).  
Evaluation of Secondary Intervention Methods in Well Control, 2003 
This report is a review of the design and capabilities of various secondary BOP intervention 
systems. In addition, the best systems and practices in use are defined, and 
recommendations on how to enhance their effectiveness are given (WEST, 2003). 
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2.4 Standards 
OLF 070 – Application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 in the Norwegian petroleum industry, 
2004. 
The overall purpose of this document is to simplify the application and work as a guideline 
for the standards IEC 61508 and IEC 6151 for use in the Norwegian petroleum industry. 
Minimum SIL requirements for the most common instrumented safety functions on a 
petroleum production installation are provided (OLF-070, 2004). 
NORSOK D-001 – Drilling facilities, 1998. 
The main objective of this NORSOK standard is to contribute to an optimization of the design 
of drilling facilities, their systems and equipments with respect to utilization, operational 
efficiency, life cycle cost and to stipulate acceptable safety levels. It describes the design, 
installation and commissioning principles and requirements for the drilling facilities and their 
system and equipment on fixed and mobile offshore installations (NOROSK D-001, 1998). 
NORSOK D-010 - Well integrity in drilling and well operations, 2004. 
In this NORSOK standard, the focus is on well integrity. It defines the minimum functional 
and performance oriented requirements and guidelines for well design, planning and 
execution of well operations in Norway (NORSOK D-010, 2004). 
IEC 61508 – Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety - 
related Systems, 2005. 
This is an international standard of rules applied in the industry. It is intended to be a basic 
functional safety standard applicable to all kinds of industry, with its origins in the process 
control industry sector. The standard has seven parts. Part 1-3 contain the requirements of 
the standard, and parts 4-7 are guidelines and examples for development. (IEC 61508, 2005). 
IEC 61511 – Functional Safety – Safety instrumented systems for the process industry 
sector, 2003. 
IEC 61511 is a technical standard that sets out practices in the engineering of systems that 
ensure the safety of an industrial process through the use of instrumentation. It converse 
the design and management requirements for a SIS through its lifetime. The standard 
consists of three parts (IEC 61511, 2003):  
 
1. Framework, definitions, systems, hardware and software requirements  
 
2. Guidelines in the application of IEC 61511-1  
 
3. Guidance for the determination of the required safety integrity levels  
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3 Reliability Theory 
A number of methods for system reliability analysis are presented by Rausand and Høyland 
(2004). A short description of each of these methods will now be given. Safety integrity level 
(SIL) and classification of function will also be introduced in this chapter. The information 
presented, is mostly based on Rausand and Høyland (2004). 
3.1 Fault Tree Analysis 
A fault tree analysis is one of the most common analysis tools when it comes to reliability 
studies. It is a deductive technique that starts with a specified system failure or accident, 
called the TOP event. Events that may lead to the top event are then identified. Next, one 
step backwards is taken, and events that leads to the previously identified events are now 
identified.  This process is continued backwards in the chain until we have enough details of 
the system. The failures and events are combined through logic gates in the fault tree. The 
result will be an illustration of the possible combination of failures and events that may lead 
to the top event. A combination of failures that leads to the top event is called a cut set. The 
fault tree may then be evaluated quantitatively or qualitatively, depending on the objective 
of the analysis. In chapter 9.1, a fault tree analysis is performed on a subsea BOP system.  An 
overview and description of the different symbols used in a fault tree, is presented in 
appendix B. 
3.2  Cause and Effect Diagram 
A cause and effect diagrams are often used to identify possible causes for a system failure, 
and is similar to a fault tree analysis, but it is less structured. The causes are arranged based 
on how important they are. Five main categories are often used. These are: manpower, 
methods, materials, machinery and environment.  A team of expert will then identify the 
factors within each category that could affect the system failure being studied. This method 
can only be performed as a qualitative analysis. Figure 3.1 shows an example of a cause and 
effect diagram. 
 
Figure 3.1 Cause and effect diagram 
Adapted from (Rausand and Høyland, 2004) 
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3.3 Event Tree 
An accident may have many different outcomes, depending on how the barriers of a given 
system will function. The most commonly used method to analyze the progression of an 
accident, is with the help of an event tree analysis. In the event tree, the possible outcomes 
resulting from failure or success of the different barriers are followed.   An event tree 
analysis is often used in risk analysis, but can also be used during design phase of a project to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the protective systems.  The analysis may be both 
qualitative and quantitative, depending on the objective of the analysis. An event tree 
analysis of a subsea BOP system is performed in chapter 11.2. 
3.4 Reliability Block Diagram 
A reliability block diagram describes the function of the system with the help of a success 
oriented network. It shows the connections of components needed to fulfill a specific system 
function. For systems with more than one function, the different functions must be 
considered individually and a separate block diagram is needed for each of the functions. 
Reliability block diagrams are mostly used for systems with non-repairable components and 
when the order of failure is irrelevant. A reliability block diagram can be both qualitative and 
quantitative, depending on the objective of the analysis. A reliability block diagram of a 
subsea BOP system is shown in chapter 11.1.  
3.5 Bayesian Belief Networks  
A Bayesian belief network (BBN) is a good way of presenting the relationship between 
system failures and its causes and contributing factors. It is very similar to cause and effect 
diagram, but can also be used as a basis for quantitative analysis. Dependencies between the 
factors in the diagram, is illustrated by arrows. It may also be useful to group the different 
causes in categories. A BBN is shown in figure 3.2 
 
Figure 3.2 Bayesian belief network 
(Rausand and Høyland, 2004) 
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3.6 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis  
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is an analysis tool used to identify potential failure 
modes in a system. These failure modes are then analyzed to determine the effects they 
may have on the system. In an FMECA, the various failure effects are also ranked in terms of 
how critical they are. FMEA/FMECAs are usually carried out in the design phase of a system 
so that weaknesses and potential failures are identified at an early stage so that the designer 
can make corrections and include potential barriers in the system. It can also be used for 
maintenance planning and as a basis for a more detailed reliability analysis.  
The FMEA work sheet used in chapter 9.2 to perform an FMEA on a subsea BOP system 
contains the following columns: 
Reference Number: In this column the component is identified with a unique reference. This 
could for example be an I.D number, tag-number or the name of the component.  
Function: The function of the component. For a pump, it could be to pump water from A to 
B with a rate of X l/min.  
Operational mode: The different operational modes. For a valve, it might be “open” or 
“closed”  
Failure mode: A failure mode is defined as a no fulfillment of the functional requirements of 
the functions specified in column 2. Note that different operational modes may have 
different failure modes.  
Failure causes or mechanism: A failure cause is something that may cause or contribute to a 
failure mode. For every failure mode that is identified, all possible failure causes are listed.  
Detection of failure: Describe possible ways you can detect the different failure modes. 
Examples of this can be human inspection and different alarm systems. 43  
Effect of failure on the system: List the effect each failure mode may have on other 
components in the system.  
Effect of failure on the system function: Describe how the systems main function is affected 
by the different failure modes.  
Risk reducing measures: Actions that will correct the failure, and prevent serious 
consequences from occurring. You could also mention measures that will reduce the 
frequency of failure modes.  
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3.7 Safety Integrity Level  
According to IEC 61508, safety integrity is the probability that a safety related system is able 
to perform the required safety functions under given conditions and within a specified 
period of time. Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is classified into four different levels, and is 
defined by the probability of failure on demand (PFD). 
Minimum SIL requirements for BOP systems are specified in OLF-070 (2004), which is a 
document made to simplify the application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 standards for use in 
the Norwegian petroleum industry. IEC 61508 is widely accepted as the basis for 
specification, design and operations of a safety instrumented system (SIS). There are four 
different SIL levels as shown in table 4.1. 
 
Table 3.1 SIL for safety functions adapted from IEC 61511 (2003) 
Safety Integrity 
Level  
Demand Mode of Operation 
 
(average probability of failure to 
perform its designed function on demand - 
PFD) 
4 ≥      to ˂     
3 ≥     to ˂     
2 ≥     to ˂     
1 ≥     to ˂     
 
3.8 Classification of functions 
For complex systems with a lot of functions, it might be beneficial to classify the different 
functions. This gives a better overview of what functions are most important, and what 
effect they have on the system. The classification will be based on the classifications 
presented by Rausand and Høyland (2004). The type of functions that will be looked at here 
will be the essential functions, auxiliary functions and information functions. On-line and Off-
line functions will also be looked at. BOP functions will be classified in chapter 7.3 
Essential functions are the functions needed for the component to fulfill its purpose. For 
example, one of the essential functions of the BOP system would be to seal an open hole. 
Auxiliary functions are supportive functions for the essential functions, but can be just as 
important. Failure of auxiliary functions can also be more safety critical then the failure of an 
essential function. For a BOP system an auxiliary function would be to contain the fluid. 
Information functions gather information, like condition monitoring, alarms, etc. The 
information function of the BOP system is the pressure monitor. 
On-line and off-line functions are used to distinguish between failures that are hidden, and 
failures that are evident. On-line functions are operating continuously so that the operator 
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has current knowledge about their state. Off-line functions are functions so rarely used that 
the operator does not know the state of the function without some test being performed 
first. 
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4 Description of a Subsea BOP System 
A BOP is used to seal, control and monitor oil and gas wells. They were developed to deal 
with erratic pressure and uncontrolled flow from the reservoir and in to the well during 
drilling, also known as a kick. A kick can potentially lead to a blowout. To accomplish this, the 
BOP system has the ability to close a well under pressure, and circulate out formation fluid 
that has moved into the well bore, while still maintaining control of the well. In case of 
emergency, it should also be able to shear the drill pipe.  
BOPs are used on land, on offshore rigs and subsea. The main difference between subsea 
and dry BOPs is that the control system is more complex with subsea systems. There is also a 
higher number of valves dude to the requirement of higher redundancy. This reason for this 
is because of limited accessibility, due to it being placed at the bottom of the sea (Rausand, 
1983b).  
4.1  Main Components of a BOP Stack  
A BOP system consists of several different components. The main components are; annular 
preventer, ram-type preventer, hydraulic connector, flexible joint, choke/kill valves and the 
control system.  How each of them work and a description of their function will be given. The 
following chapter is mainly based on information taken from the “Reliability of Subsea BOP 
systems” reports from SINTEF.  
4.1.1  Ram-Type Preventer  
Ram-type preventers were the first type of BOP that was used. It was developed during the 
1920`s by Cameron Iron Works. At this time, the BOP was mechanically operated, but during 
the 1940`s, they became hydraulically operated (Whitby, 2007). Ram-type Preventer uses 
two opposing elements that are forced towards the center of the wellbore to seal off the 
well. The rams are made of steel, with rubber seals. To help overcome the wellbore pressure 
when closing the rams, they are usually designed so that fluid from the wellbore is allowed 
to pass through a channel in the ram and exert pressure at the ram`s rear and towards the 
center of the wellbore. To make sure the rams stay in closed position, they are locked by a 
special locking device. This locking device will lock the rams in closed position, even if 
hydraulic pressure is lost.  
The ram preventers come in three types; Pipe-, Blind shear- and casing shear rams.  
Pipe rams are used to seal the well when there is a drill pipe or something similar in the well. 
It seals around the drill pipe and restricts flow in the annulus. Each pipe ram are designed to 
seal against a pipe of a specific size. That means that if a pipe ram is designed for a 5 inch 
drill pipe, and the drill pipe is changed to a different size, then the ram will no longer be able 
to seal. However, there exist pipe rams with variable bore size that can seal drill pipes of 
different sizes.  
Blind shear rams (BSR) are used to seal the well when the well does not contain a drill string 
or any other objects running through the BOP, but it also have the capability of cutting 
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through the drill string and then seal the well. Using the BSR to cut through the drill string is 
a last resort, when everything else has failed.  
A casing shear ram (CSR) have the ability to cut through objects that the BSR cannot. It can 
cut through tool joints, drill collars, casing, etc (WEST, 2004). However, the CSR does not 
have the ability to seal the well.  
4.1.2 Annular Preventer 
The annular preventer was invented by Granville Sloan Knox in 1946(Oilfield Directory, 
2009). The packing unit that closes the well is a hemispherical piece of rubber reinforced 
with steel. It is placed in the BOP housing between the head and the hydraulic piston. When 
the piston moves up, it will push against the packing unit, compressing it in to the annulus. 
This movement will seal off the well. Unlike the ram type preventers, the annular preventers 
do not have a locking device that will keep the preventers in locked position. The rubber in 
the packing unit is of high quality. It can either be natural, nitrile or neoprene, depending on 
the operational conditions.   
Annular preventers can seal around any pipe size as well as tool joints, drill collars and non-
cylindrical objects like the Kelly. It can even seal the well while the drill pipe is rotating and is 
also used during stripping operations, where the drill pipe is stripped into the well under 
pressure.   
The lifetime of annular preventers is usually longer than that of ram-type preventers. It also 
requires less maintenance. One of the reasons for this is because it is a simpler design. It 
only has two moving parts, piston and the packing unit. Also, the way it closes around the 
drill pipe, smooth upward and inward motion, reduces the internal stress and friction 
between the BOP body and the sealing element.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.3  Flexible Joint 
During drilling, because of the weather conditions, the drilling rig will move laterally. This 
leads to a lot of stress on the BOP connection with the riser. To compensate for this 
movement, a flexible joint is installed at the top of the BOP stack. With an installation like 
Figure 4.1 Annular preventer 
(Wikipedia, 2011) 
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this, angular motion up to 10 degrees is allowed. Below, a picture of a flexible joint by Oil 
States Industries is shown.  
 
Figure 4.2 Flexible Joint 
(Oil States Industries) 
4.1.4 Hydraulic Connector  
Hydraulic connectors are used to connect the BOP stack to the wellhead and the lower 
marine riser package (LMRP). The connection between the wellhead and the BOP stack is 
called the wellhead connector, and the connection between the LMRP and the BOP stack is 
called the LMRP connector or the riser connector.  
4.1.5  Choke/Kill Valves  
The kill and choke systems main function is to circulate out a kick and to kill a well when 
necessary. To do this, heavy mud is circulated down the kill line and into the annulus. The 
choke/kill system will also be used during pressure testing of the BOP system. Where the 
lines are attached on the BOP stack, depends on how the BOP stack is built up, and on the 
operator’s preference.  
The choke/kill valves are used to close the choke/kill lines. Two valves are placed in series as 
close to the outlets as possible. They use two valves to increase the reliability of the system. 
These valves are hydraulically controlled by the BOP control system. To make sure that you 
always have control of the valves, the choke/kill valves are failsafe by design. That means 
that you need hydraulic pressure to keep them open. If the hydraulic pressure is lost, loaded 
springs will force them to closed position. 
4.2 BOP Control System 
There are two main types of control system being used; Hydraulic and electro-hydraulic 
multiplex system. The oldest of the two systems, the hydraulic system, transmit commands 
by hydraulic pressure through small hoses, called pilot lines (Figure 4.3). These pilot lines will 
transmit power to the pilot valves. With this system, you need one hose for each command. 
This system is mostly used in shallow water. In deeper water, the hydraulic control system is 
not practical to use because of the increased reaction time with increasing water depth. On 
the Norwegian continental shelf, the maximum response time for closing of BOPs located on 
15 
 
the sea bed, is 45 second (NOROSK D-001, 1998). Response time refers to the time it takes 
from the signal is sent from the control panel, until the BOP function is in closed position.  
 
Figure 4.3 Multi Hose Cable 
 (Potter, 2010a) 
 
Today, all floating drilling rigs that drill in water depths greater than 5000 ft, are equipped 
with a multiplex BOP control system and all new build rigs are fitted with this type of control 
system as a standard(Potter, 2010b).With the multiplex system, coded commands are 
transmitted by electrical signals through the control umbilical, from the surface to the 
subsea control pods. There, the signal will be received by the subsea electronic module 
(SEM). The SEM will then decode the signal, and energize or de-energize the appropriate 
solenoid valve. In this type of system, you have both hydraulic and electric parts. Records 
have shown that problems which leads to retrieving the BOP for maintenance is usually 
caused by the hydraulic parts (Shanks et al., 2003).  
Figure 4.4 shows a simple sketch of a multiplex BOP control system. When activating a BOP 
function, it starts by initiating the signal at the control panel on the rig. The operator will 
have to choose if he wants to use the blue or yellow control pod. From the control panel, a 
coded electrical signal will travel down through the control umbilical to the SEM, where the 
signal will be decoded. An electrical signal will then be sent to the correct solenoid valves, 
and the valve will energize or de-energize. The solenoid valve will then send hydraulic pilot 
pressure to operate another valve, which will in turn lead the hydraulic high pressure from 
the surface to the BOP function you want to operate. The hydraulic pressure on the surface 
is delivered by a hydraulic power unit (HPU). There are also accumulators on the rig as a 
backup in case the HPU stops working. In addition, there are also accumulators placed on 
the seabed on the BOP stack. These accumulators are there as a backup in case of an 
emergency where the hydraulic connection between the surface and the BOP stack is lost. 
The accumulators on the seabed are required to have enough pressure to operate the shear 
ram and cut through the drill string, after having closed a pipe ram preventer. It should also 
have enough pressure left to disconnect the LMRP after cutting through the drill 
string(NOROSK D-001, 1998).  
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The subsea control pods are a vital part of the control system. The purpose of the control 
pods is to direct hydraulic power fluid and operate the BOP stack. It receives electrical 
signals and hydraulic power supply from the surface, and through those signals, gets 
information on where to direct the hydraulic fluid. Since the pods are such an important part 
of the BOP control system, every BOP subsea system has to be installed with two 
independent pods (API SPEC 16 D, 2004). Both pods should be capable of performing all the 
functions on the BOP. To make it easier to identify, the pods are named blue and yellow pod. 
During operations, it is common practice to alternate between using the blue and yellow pod 
every week, or after a BOP stack test. Both of these pods must be working at all times. So if 
there is a major problem with one of the pods, drilling will be suspended and the LMRP and 
riser will be retrieved to the surface so that the pod can be repaired and tested (Shanks et 
al., 2003). 
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Figure 4.4 Multiplex BOP Control System 
(Potter, 2010a) 
4.2.1  Secondary Control Systems  
In the event that the primary control system is incapable of activating the BOP functions, 
another way of operating the BOP is needed. Since the BOP is such an important unit when it 
comes to safety, it is necessary with secondary systems. The secondary systems can share 
some components, or it can be totally independent of the primary BOP control system. The 
most important secondary systems are acoustic control system and ROV activation by panel. 
A brief description of each of these systems will be given.  
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4.2.2 Acoustic Control System 
On the Norwegian continental shelf, it is mandatory for oil companies to equip the BOP 
system with an acoustic control system (NOROSK D-001, 1998).The Acoustic control system 
is a backup for the conventional control system, and is only used for emergencies when the 
other systems fail, for example if the rig moves off location. It work independently, and 
therefore increases the reliability of the BOP system. To activate the system, a series of 
signal transmissions and transformations is sent from the initial surface command. It will 
keep sending out signals until the command is activated. The initial signal is then converted 
into an acoustic signal. Coded pulses of sound will be transmitted by and underwater 
transducer to the subsea control unit. The subsea control unit and surface control unit has a 
two-way communication. An electrical signal is sent from the subsea control unit that 
controls a solenoid valve. The solenoid valve will then supply hydraulic pressure from the 
subsea accumulators to the bop functions. In Figure 4.5 you can see the signal sequence for 
an acoustic control system. To initiate the signal, a permanently mounted control system on 
the platform or a portable unit like a stand-by vessel can be used.  
 
Figure 4.5 Signal Sequence for Acoustic Control System 
(Hals and Molnes, 1984) 
4.2.3 ROV Activation by Panel  
Another way to activate the BOP is with the use of a remotely operated vehicle (ROV). The 
ROV can mechanically control the valves through the ROV intervention panel, see figure 4.6, 
and will direct hydraulic pressure to the stack with the use of hot stabs. The ROV is equipped 
with a hydraulic pump and can directly operate a function like the ram type preventer. For 
lower volume functions, the ROV is equipped with a hydraulic reservoir, but high volume 
functions such as the preventers are usually operated with sea water (WEST, 2003).  
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Figure 4.6 ROV Activation Panel 
(Potter, 2010a) 
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5 Operational Situations 
A BOP stack has several different ways to deal with kick and seal off the well. There are 
usually several different pipe rams, two annular preventers and one or two blind shear ram. 
All of these different functions should be able to seal off the well. However, not all of those 
barriers will be in effect at the same time. When a BOP stack is in use, it will go through 
several different operational situations. Below, each of these situations will briefly be 
described, and which barriers that will be able to function at the given time will be 
discussed. 
5.1 Empty Hole 
While the BOP is located on the wellhead, there will be times where there are no objects 
going through the BOP, for example when the drill string has to be pulled to change the drill 
bit, or when pressure testing with an open hole. If there are no objects going through the 
BOP, then the blind shear ram will be used to shut down the well if needed. The BOP stack 
can have one or two shear rams, depending on the BOP stack configurations. Annular 
preventers can arguably be used if necessary, but will not be able to hold off the pressure 
alone for a long period of time, because there is no system that can lock the annular 
preventers in closed position. The pipe rams will have no effect in this situation. If the stack 
is equipped with a casing shear ram, it will not have any effect in this situation. 
5.2 Drill Pipe through the BOP 
During drilling operations, the drill pipe will be going through the BOP. During this 
operational situation, the pipe rams will be an effective barrier. However, fixed pipe rams 
are only designed for sealing against a drill pipe of a given size, so only the fixed pipe ram 
that is designed for that specific drill pipe size will be able to seal off the well. Variable bore 
rams are designed to cover a wide range of drill pipe sizes. Annular preventers have the 
capability of sealing against drill pipes of all sizes, so they will always be in effect with a drill 
pipe going through the BOP. The blind shear ram is designed to shear through a drill string, 
and seal off the well if needed. However, it does not have the capability of shearing through 
the tool joints which connects the different drill pipe sections. There are BOP stacks 
configurations with more than one shear ram. This configuration will make sure that least 
one of them will stay clear of a tool joint, but the majority of rigs in use today only have one 
blind shear ram (WEST, 2004). A casing shear ram would be able to shear through a drill 
string, and even through the tool joints, but it will not have the ability to seal the well.  
5.3 Installing Casing 
Another operational mode for the BOP is when the casing is being installed. When a casing is 
going through the BOP, ripe rams will not be able to seal off the well. Standard shear rams 
will not be able to shear through the larger diameter casing. For that, a special casing shear 
ram is needed. They have the capability to shear casing tubular up to 13”, in an 18 ¾” bore 
BOP (WEST, 2004). Annular preventers will increase the probability of successfully dealing 
with a kick in this situation(Holand and Skalle, 2001). 
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5.4 Emergency Disconnect 
During an emergency, like a big storm or if a ship is on a collision course with the rig, it might 
be necessary to move the rig immediately. To do that, cutting through the drill string and 
disconnect the lower marine riser package (LMRP) is necessary. In a situation like this, the 
first thing that has to be done, is to cut through any objects in the BOP with the BSR or 
casing shear ram, and then seal off the well with the BSR. Often, the BSR will then be the 
only barrier against the well in a situation like this. On the Norwegian continental shelf, it is 
mandatory to drill with riser margin so that the mud column in the well will act as another 
barrier in case of an emergency disconnect. What that means, is that drilling must be done 
with mud heavy enough to keep the hydrostatic pressure in the well higher than the 
pressure in the formation, even if you disconnect with the LMRP. However, with increasing 
water depth, this becomes harder and harder to do, because the pressure will eventually be 
so high, that the hydrostatic pressure from the mud will fracture the formation. After a 
certain depth, it will be physically impossible to drill with riser margin. The operators can 
then apply for exemption to the NPD. 
5.5 Wireline Operations  
Wireline operations are used for many different tasks, like pulling and setting plugs, running 
production logging tools, perforating, re-perforating, etc. A normal BOP will not be very 
effective in this situation, so a special wireline BOP will usually be used during wireline 
operations. 
5.6 Drill Collars and Heavy Weighted Drill Pipes 
Drill collars and heavy weighted drill pipes are used at the bottom of the drill string, right 
above the drill bit, to add extra weight on the drill bit. Fixed pipe rams with the same size as 
the drill collars or heavy weighted drill pipes can be used to seal the well in the event of a 
kick. Variable bore rams can also be used to seal on a wide range of different sizes. Annular 
preventers can be used to close around all sizes. Standard blind shear rams cannot shear 
through drill collars and heavy weighted drill pipes. Casing shear ram can shear through, but 
does not have the ability to seal. Special types of drill collar, spiraled drill collar and squared 
drill collar, have been introduced in more recent years, and will help prevent the drill collar 
from getting stuck in the hole.  Neither the annular preventers nor pipe rams will be able to 
seal the well with this kind of drill collar going through the BOP (Hawker et al., 2001).  
 
Figure 5.1 Different Types of Drill Collars 
(Hawker et al., 2001) 
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6 BOP Stack Configurations 
The following chapter is mostly based on the results presented in the SINTEF report 
“Deepwater Kicks and BOP Performance”, written by Per Holand and Pål Skalle.  
A BOP stack can be put together in many different ways. Typically, it consists of one to six 
ram-type preventers, and one or two annular-type preventers. Annular preventers are 
placed on top of the ram-type preventers, since they are not rated for working pressure as 
high as the ram-type preventers and can close over a wide range of tubular sizes and the 
open hole(Oilfield Glossary, 2012). The BOP stack configuration is optimized to provide 
maximum pressure integrity, safety and flexibility in the event of a well control incident.  
 In this chapter, different BOP stack configurations in use will be identified, and their 
advantages and disadvantages related to a standard BOP configuration will be discussed.  
6.1 One or Two Annular Preventers 
Most BOP stacks are equipped with two annular preventers. Holand and Skalle 
(2001)evaluated the effect of using one or two annular preventers on the blowout 
probability. They found that there were no significant reductions in probability of a blowout 
by using two annular preventers instead of one.  This is because the level of redundancy in a 
BOP stack with a drill pipe is running through, is already very high.  In this calculation, it was 
assumed that annular preventers are not capable of sealing an open hole.  If we assume that 
annular preventers can seal an open hole, having two annular preventers would reduce the 
probability of a blowout to some extent. In the event that a kick occurs when a casing is 
running through the BOP, having two annular preventers would also increase the probability 
of a successful shut-in of the well. However, it is very rare for a kick to occur at this stage. 
Another important point is that annular preventers will be subjected to a lot of wear during 
stripping. This might cause the annular preventer to fail. By having two annular preventers in 
the BOP stack, the BOP does not have to be pulled if this happens.  The disadvantages of 
having two annular preventers, is the increased weight, as well as maintenance and 
investment cost.  
6.2 One or Two Blind Shear Rams 
On the Norwegian continental shelf, it is recommended to use two BSRs for deep water 
drilling. This is because deep water wells are often drilled with dynamic positioned (DP) rigs 
and without riser margin. When the water depth is too deep, drilling with riser margin is 
impossible. In an event that the DP system fails, or there is an emergency disconnect so that 
the LMRP has to disconnect from the BOP, the BSR will be the only barrier against a blowout. 
If a situation like this occurs, having two BSRs would reduce the probability of a blowout. If a 
kick occurs when there are no objects going through the BOP, having two BSRs will also be 
beneficial. 
In the event that you are forced to cut through the drill pile to seal off the well, you might 
end up with trying to cut through the drill pile at a tool joint. Most BSRs will not be capable 
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of cutting through a tool joint. Here, it would be critical with another BSR to make sure that 
the well is sealed. When adding a second BSR, it can either replace the upper pipe ram, or it 
can be added without replacing any of the existing preventers.  If you replace the second 
BSR with the upper pipe ram, you will lose some redundancy with respect to sealing around 
a drill pipe. But because there is already so much redundancy here, this will have an 
insignificant effect. The disadvantages with using two BSRs are the same as with the annular 
preventers. Additional weight, and increased maintenance and investment cost.  
6.3 Casing Shear Ram 
Some BOPs are equipped with one blind shear ram and one casing shear ram. The 
advantages of the casing shear ram, is that it can cut through casing, tool joints, drill collars, 
etc. However, a casing shear ram does not have the ability to seal.  
6.4 Fixed or Variable LPR 
Some operators prefer to use a variable bore ram as the LPR, while others prefer to use a 
fixed LPR. The difference in blowout probability between using a fixed LPR with the size of 
the most commonly used drill pipe diameter, compared to a variable bore ram, is marginal. 
A fixed LPR will increase the probability of a blowout with 2-3%. The advantages of using a 
fixed LPR, is that is has a higher hang-off capacity then a VBR.  
6.5 Lower Kill Line Above or Below LPR 
In Norway, most rigs have the lower kill line below the LPR. With a kill line placed below the 
LPR, a kick will result in a blowout if there is an external valve leak, but it is very unlikely for 
such a leak to occur.  The advantages of placing the kill line below the LPR, is that it is useful 
in kick killing operations.  
6.6 Test Ram 
Some BOP stacks have the LPR replaced with a test ram. The purpose of the test ram is to 
pressure test the rams above.  Pressure testing can also be done without a test ram, but to 
do so, you will have to install a plug. Installing a plug requires a wire line operation, which 
results in more time used on the pressure testing, and increased costs. However, the test 
ram is not used for sealing from below and up, so it will not be used for sealing the well. 
6.7 Recent BOP Stack Configurations Used 
We will now take a closer look at three different BOP stack configurations, and what 
components they include. We will look at the Deepwater Horizon BOP stack, the classical 
BOP stack, and a typical modern BOP stack.  
Deepwater Horizon BOP Stack: 
- Two annular preventers, both apart of the LMRP 
- One blind shear ram 
- One casing shear ram 
- Three variable bore rams, with the lower one being a test ram. 
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- Lower outlet below lower pipe ram  
 
Figure 6.1 Deepwater Horizon BOP Stack 
(BP, 2010) 
Classical BOP Stack:  
- Two annular preventers, with the upper annular preventer apart of the LMRP 
- One blind shear ram 
- Three fixed pipe rams 
- Lower outlet below lower pipe ram 
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Figure 6.2 Classical BOP Stack 
(Holand, 1999) 
 
Typical Modern BOP Stack: 
- Two annular preventers, with the upper annual apart of the LMRP 
- Two shear rams 
- Three pipe rams, with at least two of them being variable pipe rams.   
- Lower outlet below lower pipe ram 
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Overview of the Different Stacks: 
 
Table 6.1 Overview of the different stacks 
 
BOP Stacks 
Annular 
preventer 
Shear 
ram 
Test ram Pipe ram 
Casing 
shear 
ram 
Lower 
outlet 
below 
lower pipe 
ram 
Classical 2 1 
 
3 (fixed)    Yes 
Modern 2 2   
3 (with at least 
two of them 
being variable 
bore rams) 
 
Yes 
Deepwater Horizon  
2 (both being 
apart of the 
LMRP   
1 1 2 (variable) 1 Yes 
6.8 Pros and Cons for the Different BOP Stack Configurations 
Three different BOP stack configurations have been identified; the classical BOP stack, the 
Deepwater Horizon BOP stack and the typical modern BOP stack. Each of them is put 
together in different ways, and we will now try to identify the advantages and disadvantages 
with the different configurations. 
All three BOP stacks use two annular preventers. As discussed earlier, this does not give a 
significant reduction in blowout probability. However, it does provide redundancy in case of 
one annular preventer being damaged, and will allow operations to continue without having 
to pull the BOP to replace the damaged annular preventer. The cons of using two annular 
preventers, is the increased weight, as well as maintenance and investment costs.  
Only the modern BOP stack is equipped with two shear rams. Two shear rams is important 
when drilling without riser margin. It is also critical if you try to shear through a tool joint.  
The shear ram will not be able to shear through a tool joint, so having another shear ram to 
make sure the well is sealed, can be the difference between a blowout or not.  
Instead of using two blind shear rams, the Deep Water Horizon BOP used a special casing 
shear ram. The advantages of the casing shear ram, is that it can cut through casing, tool 
joints, drill collars, etc. However, a casing shear ram does not have the ability to seal. The 
classical BOP stack only have one shear ram and no casing shear ram, so it will be lighter and 
cheaper, but will have a lower probability of stopping a blowout in certain situations.  
A test ram was installed in the Deep Water Horizon BOP. The advantages of the test ram, is 
that pressure testing takes less time. For the classical and modern bop stack, pressure 
testing will take much longer because a plug will have to be installed to perform a pressure 
test.   
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Both the Deepwater Horizon BOP stack and the modern BOP stack are equipped with 
variable pipe rams. Using a variable pipe ram as the LPR will reduce the probability of a 
blowout slightly. The classical BOP stack only consists of fixed pipe rams. The advantages of 
this setup, is that it has a higher hang off capacity.  
6.8.1 Case Study 
To get a better view of what barriers are available for the different BOP configurations, 
simple sketches were made. Two different cases are presented. Case 1 represents a situation 
with a standard drill pipe going through the BOP while case 2 represent a case with an open 
hole. Since it is a standard drill pipe going through the BOP in case 1, it is assumed that both 
variable bore rams on the Deepwater Horizon configuration and two variable bore rams on 
the modern configuration will fit around the drill pipe. The IBOP and the kill/choke line 
valves will also have to work in order to prevent a blowout, but these will not be shown in 
these sketches. The casing shear ram is included in the Deepwater horizon sketch. This is not 
a barrier that can seal the well on its own, but it will increase the probability of a successful 
isolation of the well by cutting through the drill pipe, and then allowing the BSR to seal the 
well without having to cut through the drill pipe first.  
Case 1 – Drill String Going Through the BOP:  
DWH BOP Stack: 
AP
BSR 1
PR
AP
CSR
PR
 
Figure 6.3 Available barriers for the DWH stack with a drill string going through the BOP 
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Modern BOP Stack: 
BSR 1
BSR 2
PR
AP
AP
PR
 
Figure 6.4 Available barriers for the Modern stack with a drill string going through the BOP 
 
Classical BOP Stack: 
AP
BSR
PR
AP
 
Figure 6.5 Available barriers for the classical stack with a drill string going through the BOP 
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Case 2 – Open Hole:  
DWH BOP Stack: 
BSR
 
Figure 6.6 Available barriers for the DWH Stack with no objects going through the BOP 
 
Modern BOP Stack: 
BSR 2
BSR 1
 
Figure 6.7 Available barriers for the modern stack with no objects going through the BOP 
 
Classical BOP Stack: 
BSR
 
Figure 6.8 Available barriers for the classical stack with no objects going through the BOP 
 
This simple overview shows that in both case 1 and case 2, the modern configuration has 
more redundancy then the other configurations. The classical BOP is the configuration with 
the least redundancy. The BSR is the only barrier that can seal the well without a drill pipe 
going through the BOP. Failure of the BSR for the DWH and the classical configuration will in 
case 2 results in a blowout if there is a kick and control of the well is lost. It can also be seen 
that all BOPs have most barriers available when there is a drill pipe going through the BOP. 
The situation with a drill pipe going through the BOP is also the situations when the 
probability of a kick is highest. The reliability study performed by Holand and Skalle (2001) 
showed that 45 out 48 kicks occurred when there was a normal drill string running through 
the BOP.  
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7 Main Functions and Performance Requirements of a BOP System 
To get a better understanding of the BOP system, the main functions and performance 
requirements will be identified. This will give a better overview of what exactly a BOP should 
be able to do in order to function as a safety-critical system. The functions identified here 
will also be classified.   
7.1 Main Functions 
The primary function of a BOP system, as described in NORSOK D-010, is to prevent well fluid 
from leaking from the well bore to the environment, and provide capabilities to close in and 
seal the well bore with or without tools/equipment going through the BOP. More 
specifically, it should be able to seal the annulus between the drill pipe and the casing, as 
well as being able to seal the well if no objects are going through the BOP. In an emergency 
situation, it should also have the ability to shear through a drill string going through the BOP 
before sealing the well.  To be able to deal with kicks, a BOP system must also have the 
capability to add and withdraw controlled volumes of fluid from the well bore.  
In OLF 070, the main functions for the BOP are defined as follow: 
1. Seal around drill pipe 
2. Seal an open hole 
3. Shear drill pipe and seal off well 
In addition to performing these main functions, the BOP system should also perform some 
non- safety activities. This includes using the rams to center the drill string and hanging off 
the drill string by closing a set of pipe rams to support its weight. It should also be able to 
monitor the well bore pressure (Transocean, 2011).   
To sum up, the functions of a BOP system is: 
 Contain well fluid  
 Seal around drill pipe 
 Seal an open hole 
 Shear drill pipe and seal off well 
 Add and withdraw controlled volumes of fluid from the well bore 
 Center the drill string 
 Hanging off the drill string on the pipe ram 
 Monitor well bore pressure 
7.2 Performance Requirements 
To make sure that BOP systems are able to perform these functions to an acceptable level, 
they have to meet the associated performance requirements. There will be different 
requirements depending on where you are operating.  Here, the requirements in place on 
the Norwegian continental shelf will be looked at. Functional requirements, SIL requirements 
and test requirements will be looked at. 
31 
 
7.2.1 Functional Requirements 
According to the NPD guidelines, section 31, when a BOP is placed on the sea bed, the 
response time for closing the annular preventers and pipe rams, should be less than 45 
seconds. The response time refers to the time it takes from when the command is initiated 
at the control panel, until the action is completed at the BOP (Oljedirektoratet, 1999). 
To make sure the shear rams can cut through the drill strings, they should be capable of 
cutting through the pipe of the highest grade drill pipe in use, as well as closing off the bore. 
If an object that cannot be sheared is running through the BOP, there should be at least one 
pipe ram or annular preventer able to seal the actual size of the item (NOROSK D-001, 1998). 
The BOP accumulators should have enough stored pressure to close one shear ram, two pipe 
rams, unlatch the LMRP and have 50% of its capacity left (Oljedirektoratet, 1999). 
When drilling with a tapered drill string, there should be pipe rams fitted for each pipe size. 
If using variable bore rams, they must have sufficient hang off capacity (NORSOK D-010, 
2004). 
With a BOP system on the sea bed, an acoustic or alternative control system must be 
installed. The acoustic accumulators should have enough pressure to cut through the drill 
string after closing a pipe ram preventer and still have enough pressure left to disconnect 
the LMRP. To operate the acoustic control system, a portable unit that can be carried by a 
single person should be available, incase evacuation of the platform is needed 
(Oljedirektoratet, 1999). 
7.2.2 SIL Requirements 
OLF 070 differentiates between two main functions for the BOP when setting the SIL related 
to closing the well: 
 The annular/pipe ram function (i.e. seal around drill pipe) 
 The BSR function (i.e. seal and open hole, and shear drill pipe and seal off well) 
 The minimum SIL requirement given to both annular/pipe ram function and the BSR 
function, is SIL 2. As seen from table 3.1, that equals to a PFD of ≥     to ˂    . The total 
safety function includes activation on the rig and the remotely operated valves needed to 
close the BOP in order to prevent a blowout or a well leak. This SIL requirement is based on 
experience, with a design practice that has shown to give a satisfactory safety level (OLF-
070, 2004).  
7.2.3 Test Requirements 
By testing the equipment, it is verified that the equipment functions as required, that the 
pressure integrity is intact and that the control system is functioning. If all the requirements 
are not met, there is an opportunity to fix it before something goes wrong. In Norway, the 
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government has established regulations for how a BOP should be tested. Norway requires 
the following BOP test schedule:   
 Installation test 
 Test after running casing 
 There should never be more than 14 days since last pressure test  
 There should never be more than 7 days since last function test 
 The BOP should be tested to maximum expected working pressure at least every six 
months 
Before all pressure tests, there should be a low pressure test to 200-300 psi. The 
pressure test requires that the equipment holds the low pressure tests for five minutes, 
and high pressure tests for 10 minutes. When the BOP is subsea, the acoustic system 
should be function tested during all BOP tests (Holand, 1999).  
NORSOK D-010 and API RP 53 also propose recommended test practices for BOP`s. See 
appendix A for these recommendations. 
7.3 Classifications of the Main Functions  
The functions identified earlier, will now be classified according to the classifications 
described in chapter 3.8. The classifications are presented in table 7.1 and table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.1 Classification of functions 
 
Class Function 
Essential functions Seal the well with a drill string going through the BOP 
Seal the well with no objects going through the BOP 
Shear through a drill string and seal the well 
Add and withdraw controlled volumes of fluid from the well bore 
Hang off the drill string on the pipe ram. 
Auxiliary functions Contain the fluid 
Center the drill string 
Information functions 
Monitor well bore pressure 
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Table 7.2 Classifications of evident and hidden functions 
 
Class Function 
On-line functions 
Contain well fluid 
Monitor well bore pressure 
Off-line functions Seal the well with a drill string going through the BOP 
Seal the well with no objects going through the BOP 
Shear through a drill string and seal the well 
Add and withdraw controlled volumes of fluid from the well bore 
Hang off the drill string on the pipe ram 
 
The most critical functions here with respect to a blowout would be to seal the well with a 
drill string going through the BOP, seal the well with no objects going through the BOP, shear 
through a drill string and seal the well, and contain the well fluid. Failure of any of these 
functions would result in a blowout if control of the well is lost.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
34 
 
8 Reliability Assessment Challenges With a BOP System 
Performing an accurate reliability assessment of a BOP system can be challenging for many 
reasons. The ability of the BOP system to function as a safety barrier will vary, depending on 
which operating situation it is going through. The likelihood of demand to be handled will 
also depend on these operating situations. Using an average estimate for the BOP`s ability to 
function on demand will therefore not give an accurate representation of the reliability of 
the BOP.  
When calculating the availability of a BOP, it is common to assume a fixed test interval, τ. In 
practice, this may not be the case and the test interval may vary. If variation in the test 
exists, and the τ value represents an average test interval, the formula gives a too optimistic 
result. (Holand and Skalle, 2001) 
The formula for availability can be expressed by: 
           
   
 
 
Another important point is that during drilling, it is not possible to perform a function test on 
the BSR. On top of that, it is not possible to test the BSR on the ability to shear and seal a 
pipe, because it is a destructive test, the BSR would be destroyed.  
It is often assumed 100% test coverage for the BOP, but this will not be the case. Certain 
failures will not be identified during functional testing. To deal with this problem, the PDS 
method has introduced the PTIF to account for the probability that certain failures are not 
identified during testing. The PTIF is added to the PFD, and we get the critical safety 
unavailability (CSU). For a single system, CSU is given by (Stein Hage et al., 2010) : 
             
A BOP system has many common components. This means that common cause failure will 
be an important factor when calculating the reliability of the BOP system. Common cause 
failures have not always been included in the reliability studies of BOPs. How to deal with 
common cause failures is described by Stein Hage et al. (2010). 
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9 Fault Tree and FMEA Analysis 
In this chapter, two different reliability analysis methods are performed.  A simple 
qualitative fault tree analysis is made to give a better overview of what component failure 
will lead to the top event. Because the barriers in effect will depend on the operational 
situation of the BOP, two different fault trees are made; one when there is a drill string going 
through the BOP, and one with an open hole. The analysis will be based on the modern BOP 
stack. It is assumed that the annular preventer will not be able to seal an open hole. The 
branch “P2” is the same for both fault trees. The fault trees are made with the program Cara 
Fault Tree. The cut sets can be found in appendix C. For a more detailed fault tree analysis, 
see the report “Deepwater Kicks and BOP Performances” by Holand and Skalle (2001). A 
failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is also presented to show how the failures may 
occur, the effect of the failure and what can be done to prevent them from happening.  
9.1 Fault Tree: 
Open Hole: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Drill Pipe Going Through the BOP: 
 
Figure 9.1 Fault tree with top event "Not able to seal an open hole" 
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Figure 9.2 Fault tree with top event "Not able to seal around drill pipe"
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Figure 9.3 P2 branch for the fault trees 
 
 
9.2 FMEA 
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System:  
Blowout 
preventer 
       
Description of unit           
Description of 
failure                                          
Effect of 
failure        
Ref. Nr.  Function 
Operational 
mode  Failure mode  
Failure cause or 
mechanism Detection of failure 
On the 
subsystem 
On the system 
function 
Risk reducing 
measures  
Activation 
 button at 
 drillers panel 
Send 
activation 
signal  to the 
BOP 
N/A Fail to activate 
Operator error 
Testing/operation 
Pods will not 
receive 
activation 
signal 
BOP will not 
activate, 
use 
acoustic/secondary 
control system to 
activate the BOP 
Improve operator 
training 
No electrical power 
Frequent testing and 
inspection. Backup 
power 
Yellow/Blue 
 pod 
Direct 
hydraulic 
power fluid 
and operate 
the BOP 
Running 
Fail to deliver  
hydraulic power 
High pressure valve 
 do not open 
Testing/operation 
  
BOP will not 
activate, 
switch pod 
Frequent testing, 
change  
damaged parts 
during maintenance. 
Always have one 
working pod 
Solenoid valve does  
not activate 
Testing/operation 
SEM do not to work Testing/operation 
Standby Fail to activate failure at control panel Testing/operation 
Not able to switch 
pod. Current pod 
will 
 still work 
Frequent testing and 
inspection, change 
parts 
if damaged 
HPU 
Deliver 
hydraulic 
pressure to 
operate the 
BOP and 
charge the 
accumulators 
N/A 
Does not  
deliver enough 
pressure 
Leakage  Operations/pressure 
sensor 
Accumulators 
will not be 
charged 
BOP will not 
activate, 
use accumulators 
Regular inspection 
and maintenance. 
Backup HPU Pump failure 
No electrical power Operations  
Regular inspection 
and 
maintenance. 
Backup power 
Accumulators 
Deliver 
hydraulic 
pressure to 
operate the 
BOP 
Charged 
Does not 
deliver enough 
pressure Leakage 
Operations/ 
Pressure sensor 
  
BOP will not 
activate, 
use HPU Frequent testing 
Uncharged 
Does not 
charge 
Testing/operation   
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Ref. Nr.  Function 
Operational 
mode  
Failure 
mode  
Failure cause or 
mechanism 
Detection of 
failure 
On the 
subsystem 
On the system 
function 
Risk reducing 
measures  
Shuttle 
valve 
Direct 
hydraulic 
 power fluid 
from  
blue and 
yellow pod 
Transition 
between  
blue and 
yellow 
Not able to 
complete 
transition 
Stuck due to corrosion 
Testing/operation   
BOP will not activate 
Frequent testing. 
Change 
during maintenance 
Position to 
direct pressure  
from blue pod 
Fail to 
change 
 position 
Object blocking  
movement BOP will not 
activate, 
use the other pod Stuck due to corrosion 
Position to 
direct pressure  
from yellow 
pod 
Fail to 
change  
position 
Object blocking  
movement BOP will not 
activate, 
use the other pod Stuck due to corrosion 
Acoustic 
control 
 system 
Backup 
activation 
 system of 
BOP 
N/A 
Failure of 
acoustic  
signal 
Electrical error Testing/operation 
Subsea control 
unit  
does not 
receive 
activation 
signal 
BOP will not 
activate,  
use another 
secondary 
control system 
Frequent testing 
Hydraulic  
lines 
Deliver 
hydraulic 
 fluid 
N/A Leakage Wear Testing/operations 
Hydraulic units 
does not 
receive enough 
hydraulic power 
BOP will not activate 
Frequent 
testing/change 
lines when damaged 
Preventer 
Close/open 
ram 
Open Fail to close Failure of Control 
signal/activation 
  
Testing/operations   BOP will not activate Regular testing and 
inspection, replace 
damaged 
electrical parts 
Closed 
Fail to open   
Tools will not 
be able to pass 
  
Leakage 
Damage on 
 sealing element 
Testing/operations 
  
BOP will not be able 
to  
contain well 
pressure, 
activate another 
preventer 
change sealing 
 element frequently 
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10 Reliability Analysis of BOP System in the past 
Reliability analysis of BOP systems have been performed in the past. The most thorough 
analysis was performed by Holand and Skalle (2001), were fault tree was used to calculate 
the reliability of BOP systems.  Another mayor project were BOP reliability was calculated 
was done by Rausand (1983a). Information from many different rigs was gathered, and 
mean fractional dead time (MFDT) were calculated. FMECA analysis of the components of 
the system was also done.    
Fault tree analysis is a very practical way of calculating the reliability, and it also gives a good 
overview of what combination of component failure will lead to the top event. However, a 
fault tree analysis does not take in to account the sequence of events. It views the system as 
a static situation, and does not take care of the dynamic effect. The result from a fault tree 
analysis will therefore not be 100% accurate.  
An FMECA analysis is a qualitative analysis, and does not give numbers on how well the 
reliability of the system is.  FMECAS are used to provide input to design related issues. MFDT 
calculation assume fixed test interval, but in practice, the test interval may vary. This will 
give a result that is too optimistic Holand and Skalle (2001). 
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11 Alternative Methods for BOP Reliability Assessment 
11.1 Reliability Block Diagram 
One way to perform a reliability analysis of a BOP system that is not often used is with the 
help of a block diagram. However, with complex systems, the block diagram will quickly 
become very large and complicated, so it is not that practical. Each function of the system 
must be considered individually, and a separate reliability block diagram has to be made for 
each function. The block diagram presented here, gives a rough overview of how it could be 
done, and is not very detailed. A separate block diagram will have to be made for the 
annular preventer, pipe ram and BSR. The “preventer” block, represents the probability that 
the preventer in question (annular, pipe ram or BSR) is able to seal the well once it is closed 
successfully. This value will be different for each preventer.  By inserting the probability of 
success in each of the blocks, you can calculate the probabilities that the different functions 
are able to activate and seal the well.  
  
Acoustic
Control 
system
Activation 
Button at 
Drillers panel
Blue pod
Yellow pod
HPU
Accumulator
Shuttle valve
Hydarulic 
lines
Accumulator
Preventer
 
Figure 11.1 Reliability Block Diagram for a BOP System 
 
11.2 Event Tree 
Event tree analysis is a good way of presenting the different outcomes of an accident, 
depending on what barriers are able to work as intended. The probability that the different 
barriers will work when needed can for example be found with the use of the reliability block 
diagram shown in the previous chapter.     
The event tree presented here is based on the modern BOP stack configuration. Two 
situations will be looked at. With a drill pipe is going through the BOP, and a situation where 
there is no objects going through the BOP. 
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With a Drill Pipe Going Through the BOP: 
Kick (f)
Upper AP
YES
No
Lower AP
YES
No
PR 1 PR 2 BSR 1 BSR 2
YES
YES
YES
No
No
End state
A: Well is sealed
B: Well is sealed
C: Well is sealed
D: Well is sealed
E: Well is sealed
YES
F: Well is sealed
G: Blowout
No
No
 
Figure 11.2 Event tree for a situation with a drill string going through the BOP 
 
Empty Hole: 
Kick (f)
BSR 1
YES
No
BSR 2
YES
No
End state
A: Well is sealed
B: Well is sealed
C: Blowout
 
Figure 11.3 Event tree for a situation with no objects going through the BOP  
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12 New Approach to Reliability Assessment of a BOP System 
12.1 A Combination of Fault Tree and Event Tree 
In this chapter, a new approach to reliability assessment of BOP systems is presented. This 
approach is based on combining a fault tree analysis with an event tree analysis in order to 
get a more accurate result.  One event tree is made for the situation with an open hole, and 
one for the situation where a drill pipe is going through the BOP. Fault tree analyses are then 
performed to calculate the PFD for each of the branches in the event tree.  The probability of 
each of the end states in the event tree can then be calculated.  
This approach will take in to account the sequence of events.  The operational situations 
“open hole” and “drill pipe going through the BOP” will be analyzed separately to take in to 
account the fact that different barriers will be available during each of the situations. How 
the analysis can be done, is shown below.  
Case 1 - Open Hole: 
Event Tree: 
Kick (f)
BSR 1
YES
No
BSR 2
YES
No
A: Well is sealed
B: Well is sealed
C: Blowout
1-PFD_BSR
1-PFD_BSRPFD_BSR
PFD_BSR
 
Figure 12.1 Event tree for a situation with no objects going through the BOP 
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Fault Tree for BSR: 
 
Figure 12.2 Fault tree for the BSR branch of the event tree 
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Figure 12.3 P2 Branch for the fault tree 
End State Calculations: 
 
Figure 12.4 End State Calculations 
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Case 2 - Drill Pipe in BOP: 
Event Tree: 
Upper AP
YES
No
Lower AP
YES
No
PR 1 PR 2 BSR 1 BSR 2
YES
YES
YES
No
No
End state
A: Well is sealed
B: Well is sealed
C: Well is sealed
D: Well is sealed
E: Well is sealed
YES
F: Well is sealed
G: Blowout
PFD_AP
PFD_AP
PFD_PR
PFD_PR
PFD_BSR
PFD_BSR
No
No
1-PFD_AP
1-PFD_AP
1-PFD_PR
1-PFD_PR
1-PFD_BSR
1-PFD_BSR
 
Figure 12.5 Event tree for a situation with a drill string going through the BOP 
 
Fault Tree for AP: 
 
Figure 12.6 fault tree for the AP branch of the event tree 
 
 
 
47 
 
Fault Tree for PR: 
 
Figure 12.7 Fault tree for the PR branch of the event tree 
Fault Tree for BSR: 
 
Figure 12.8 Fault tree for the BSR branch of the event tree 
 
End State Calculation: 
 
Figure 12.9 End State Calculations 
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13 Conclusion and Further Research  
To improve the reliability assessment of a BOP system, it is suggested to combine a fault tree 
analysis with an event tree analysis. This takes the sequence of events in to account, and 
thus make the analysis more accurate. Further, while doing the analyses, it is recommended 
to conduct two separate analyses. One for the operational situations “open hole” and 
another for the operational situation “drill pipe going through the BOP”. This is done 
because the barriers in effect vary depending on what operational situation the BOP is going 
through.  
For further research it is recommended that a more detailed fault tree analysis is done with 
the combination of an event tree analysis and with industry data used as input for the 
calculations. Common cause failures should also be taken in to account during the 
calculations.  
Not all faults are found during testing, and some functions cannot be tested at all during 
some parts of the operations. For example, the shear ram cannot be function tested during 
drilling, and it is never possible to test the shear rams ability to shear, since that is a 
destructive test.  This is a factor that will influence the reliability analysis of the equipment, 
and needs to be taking in to account when doing the calculations for an accurate result.  
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Appendix A: Recommended Test Practices for Subsea BOP Stacks 
 
Figure A1 Recommended test practices 
(API RP 53, 2004) 
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Figure A2 Recommended test practices 
(API RP 53, 2004) 
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Figure A3 Recommended test practices 
(NORSOK D-010, 2004) 
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Appendix B: Fault Tree Symbols 
 
 
Figure A4 fault tree symbols 
(Holand and Skalle, 2001) 
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Appendix C: Cut sets 
Cut set for the fault tree “not able to seal around drill pipe”: 
Cut set(s) with 2 components (Total: 2) 
   {Basic 10,Basic 14}  
   {Basic 10,Basic 11}  
  
Cut set(s) with 3 components (Total: 2) 
   {Basic 10,Basic 12,Basic 13}  
   {Basic 10,Basic 15,Basic 16}  
  
Cut set(s) with 5 components (Total: 8) 
   {Basic 1,Basic 5,Basic 7,Basic 3,Basic 9}  
   {Basic 1,Basic 5,Basic 7,Basic 4,Basic 9}  
   {Basic 1,Basic 6,Basic 7,Basic 3,Basic 9}  
   {Basic 1,Basic 6,Basic 7,Basic 4,Basic 9}  
   {Basic 2,Basic 5,Basic 7,Basic 3,Basic 9}  
   {Basic 2,Basic 5,Basic 7,Basic 4,Basic 9}  
   {Basic 2,Basic 6,Basic 7,Basic 3,Basic 9}  
   {Basic 2,Basic 6,Basic 7,Basic 4,Basic 9} 
 
Cut set for the fault tree “Not able to seal an open hole”: 
Cut set(s) with 2 components (Total: 4) 
   {Basic 10,Basic 14}  
   {Basic 10,Basic 11}  
   {Basic 10,Basic 17}  
   {Basic 1,Basic 2}  
  
Cut set(s) with 3 components (Total: 2) 
   {Basic 10,Basic 12,Basic 13}  
   {Basic 10,Basic 15,Basic 16}  
 
 
 
  
56 
 
Appendix D: Pre-Study Report 
 
PREFACE 
The pre-study report is meant as an overview of the activities that shall be performed in my 
master thesis, as well as a time schedule for the project.  The master thesis is carried out 
during the spring of 2012, as part of the 2-year master`s degree in Subsea technology at 
NTNU.  The duration of the project is 20 weeks. 
The title of the master thesis is: “Improved methods for reliability assessments of safety-
critical systems: An application example for BOP systems”, and will be written at the 
Department of Production and Quality Engineering.  
Professor Mary Ann Lundteigen will be the main supervisor for this project, and Professor 
Marvin Rausand will be the co-supervisor.  
BACKGROUND 
System reliability assessments provide important input to decision-making in relation to 
design-related issues as well as during operations and maintenance. The main purpose of a 
system reliability assessment is to provide realistic predictions of the future performance of 
the system, within the constraints of available data, operation conditions, and modeling 
capabilities. Special applications and operating conditions sometimes reveal inadequacies in 
current assessment method. One such application is the blowout preventer (BOP), a safety-
critical system that is used to ensure safe drilling and well interventions of oil and gas wells. 
The ability of the BOP system to function as a safety barrier depends on the ongoing 
operation, whether it is drilling, tripping-in, tripping-out, well logging, and so on. At the same 
time, the likelihood demands to be handled depends on the same operations. An average 
estimate of the BOP`s ability to of function on demand is therefore not an adequate 
reliability parameter. A BOP system deviates from many other safety barrier systems since it 
does not have a fail-safe design (except for the choke and kill valves). Another deviation is 
due to the many different uses of BOP and its components. Many of the components are 
operated much more often than during the periodic proof tests. The usual formulas for 
reliability calculations based on periodic proof testing can therefore not be used directly.  
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OBJECTIVES 
In this master thesis, the main objective is to propose solutions to some of the challenges 
indicated in the chapter about background, using the BOP as an example. More specifically: 
3. Give a presentation of a typical (standard) BOP system, its requirements and 
reliability challenges 
d. Describe and classify the main functions and the associated performance 
requirements of a BOP system. 
e. Identify and discuss the main operation situations of a BOP in light of the 
ability of the BOP to stop well kicks. 
f. Identify recent BOP stack configurations and describe the pros and cons of 
these related to a standard BOP configurations 
 
4. Suggest improved approaches to reliability assessment of BOP systems that can 
incorporate some of the above challenges 
a. Carry out and document a literature survey on how reliability analyses of 
BOPs have been performed in the past, and discuss the limitations of these 
approaches. 
b. Suggest alternative methods for BOP reliability assessment and illustrate their 
pros and cons through a case study 
c. Propose a new overall approach to risk and reliability assessment of BOP 
systems, which include proposals for how to solve some of the identified 
challenges 
d. Identify related issues that need further research, and give recommendations 
for such research. 
 
TASKS 
The project has been divided in to 5 different main tasks. I will now go through each of them 
and analyze the work task’s content.  
Task 1: Pre-study report 
The pre-study report is done at the start of the project. It will be handed in within 
three weeks after the date of the task handout.  The pre-study report is meant as an 
overview of the activities that shall be performed in my master thesis, as well as a 
time schedule for the project.  
The main challenges of writing the pre-study report will be to estimate the time 
needed to complete each of the tasks.  
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Task 2: Literature survey 
I will conduct a literature survey to get an overview of the most relevant sources on 
the topic. This will be initiated before I start writing to make sure I do not miss 
important information. The literature survey will be an ongoing process through the 
starting phase of the project. 
The challenges here will be to find the most relevant sources as early as possible. If 
you do not do a thorough literature survey, you might miss important information 
that could have helped you in your work.  
Task 3: Give a presentation of a typical BOP system, its requirements and reliability 
challenges 
Through earlier projects, I have gained knowledge of the main functions of a BOP 
system and how it works. This knowledge will make it easier for me to perform this 
task.    
However, I believe it will be a challenge to identify recent BOP stack configurations, 
since this information is hard to find.  
Task 4: Suggest improved approaches to reliability assessment of BOP systems 
In this task, I will have to find out how reliability analysis of BOP`s have been 
performed in the past, and identify the limitations of these approaches. Based on 
this, I will suggest alternative methods for BOP reliability assessment present the pros 
and cons of these methods.  
The main challenge here will be to suggest new methods of reliability assessment, 
and propose ways to solve identified challenges.  
Task 5: Conclusion and finalizing the report 
This is the last stage of the project. All other tasks should now be completed, and the 
time will be spent on putting everything together. The conclusion will also be written 
at this stage.  
PROJECT DURATION 
This master thesis was started January 16th 2012, and the delivery date is June 11th 2012. The 
master thesis is scheduled for 20 weeks of work, but because of Easter, we have been given 
1 more week. The recommended workload according the NTNU`s guidelines, is 48 hours 
each week. That gives a total of 960 hours of work.  
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GANTT DIAGRAM 
The figure below shows a Gantt-diagram, which illustrates the project schedule and 
important milestones.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
